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Introduction
Modern conflicts, while being fought locally, might have a far wider and even 
global impact. Typically, the contemporary conflict environment, or  ‘conflict 
ecosystem’, consists of a wide variety of (internationally)  interconnected 
actors and spill-over effects such as displaced persons and refugees.1 Fall 
simply used the overarching term ‘doctrine’ for the variegated ideology, 
religion, belief, socioeconomic, political or other notions these wars are 
fought for.2 What stands out in all these matters is the centrality of  humans 
and their convictions, attitudes, beliefs, aspirations, norms, emotions and – 
most importantly – their behaviour. Despite the impact of innovations in ar-
eas such as technology and artificial intelligence, modern conflict  dynamics 
will largely evolve as a consequence of actions  undertaken in the human 
domain. Mitigating today’s sophisticated threats, thus,  requires us to look 
beyond the traditional military realm and inherently involves  concepts 
 focused on relevant populations.3 Kilcullen, in this regard, devised a the-
ory of competitive control. Based on insights from the fields of counter-
insurgency and rebel governance, he argues that when armed actors vie 
for control over a populace, the actor ‘best able to establish a predictable, 
consistent, and wide-spectrum normative system of control’ will prevail.4 
This chapter explores this argument and proposes multiple alterations for 
embedding it in modern warfare. While underlining the relevance of a local 
perspective and human behaviour, we aim to broaden the scope of targeted 
actors and argue that targeting groups is more relevant than targeting in-
dividuals. For this purpose, we adopt the fundamental proposition that a 
competition for control can be won by altering an existing normative system 
instead of establishing a new system. This will enable us to build a compre-
hensive framework for designing influence activities rooted in actual human 
behaviour – contrary to focusing on attitudes, preferences, or legitimacy.5
Thus, this chapter not only aims to provide an academic analysis of 
the utility of the theory of competitive control in modern warfare but 
also  presents a guideline for actually operationalising this population- 
centric approach in the conduct of war. Whereas the first decade of the 
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21st century saw a return of counterinsurgency and affiliated influence 
activities during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, interest in this ap-
proach quickly faded away during the 2010s. This was the consequence not 
only of the lack of success in both wars but also of the renewed emergence 
of big power competition which acted as a catalyst for a reorientation to-
ward conventional warfare. Yet, as aforementioned, the human domain 
remained central to the conflicts that were fought over the last decade. 
State actors like Russia or Iran actively exploited social cleavages in neigh-
bouring countries, while non-state actors such as the Islamic State, Boko 
Haram and Al Shabab successfully established influence and control over 
relevant populations. Embedding influence activities in the conduct of 
war, therefore, is not only highly relevant for modern warfare but also 
essential for winning the competition for control over the local popula-
tion in a conflict ecosystem. For this purpose, we will elaborate upon the 
theory of competitive control and subsequently develop a framework for 
influence activities. Doing so, however, first requires us to explore the most 
 fundamental aspects of human behaviour and the relevance of the local 
level under conflict conditions.
The primacy of behaviour and the imperative of the local level
Human interaction and behaviour are central to understanding conflict. 
The emphasis of conflict studies however lies on attitudes and preferences of 
relevant populations.6 Whereas behaviour is often influenced by interrelated 
concepts such as attitudes, values and norms, it is certainly not determined 
by these factors. Hence, emphasising attitude exclusively is insufficient.7
This is easily understood through the following example of an 
 information operations (IO)-campaign in Afghanistan that aimed to  reduce 
the  number of IED-strikes and American deaths.8 Although this effort 
positively changed the local attitude towards US soldiers by portraying 
them as friendly people devoted to their family, an increase in IED-strikes 
 nevertheless occurred. This prompted the IO-campaign team to evaluate 
its methods, which revealed two reasons for the failure. First, it was found 
that those involved in placing the IEDs were mostly extremists, whose at-
titude nor behaviour could be changed. Second, and more important, the 
IO-campaign showed images of soldiers with their families at home, which 
also depicted the beauty and richness of the United States. The unintended 
effect of this was that the people involved in producing and transporting 
IEDs, who were mainly motivated by financial reasons (and therefore more 
susceptible to the IO-campaign than extremists), stepped up their effort in 
order to earn money for immigration to the United States. Thus, contrary 
to the desired effect, the locals involved boosted production and transpor-
tation which resulted in an abundance of available IEDs. This contributed 
directly to an increase in US combat deaths.
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This example illustrates an assumption that attitude alone could 
 determine behaviour, while in reality a bias towards attitude might have 
an adverse effect on the desired change of behaviour. Tatham, Mackay and 
Rowland, therefore, advocate that behaviour is what matters most in com-
munication efforts and influencing a target audience should be grounded in 
social and behavioural science.9 The term communication, in this regard, 
not only concerns verbal communication, but all activities aimed at influ-
encing the behaviour of an actor.
Since behaviour is key, it is relevant to explore this concept further. 
Clearly, all humans differ. At the individual level, biological, psychologi-
cal and neurological variations lead to immense differences in outlook and 
behaviour. This is further augmented by inter alia sociological, geographi-
cal and climatological differences at group level. These differentiations will 
lead to significant variety in behaviour. In addition, different normative 
standards will lead to a different appreciation of behaviour and actions. 
In other words, what may be considered unacceptable at a certain place or 
a certain point in time may be customary and widely accepted at another 
place or another moment.
Consequently, behaviour should always be understood from a local and 
temporal perspective. This, however, is more complicated than it seems. 
Bar-Yam, in this regard, emphasises that the complexity of the human civili-
sational system, combined with progressive specialisation, blurs our ability 
to understand society as a whole and only enables us to understand a small 
portion of our social environment.10 Applied to contemporary conflicts, this 
insight implies that any attempt to define and understand concepts such 
as legitimacy and extremism should be understood from a temporal, local 
behavioural context. This is echoed in the debate on legitimation in both 
counterinsurgency and rebel governance literature, which stresses that last-
ing effects can only be obtained by exploiting local patterns of legitimacy.11 
The same ‘local logic’ pertains to extremism which can be defined as the 
level of deviation of the median popular preferences and therefore should 
also be understood from a local perspective.12 Consequently, influencing 
behaviour as part of the conduct of war requires the ability to tailor all rel-
evant activities to local circumstances. How to design and implement such 
an approach?
Discussions on how to enhance popular support through legitimation 
are often dichotomised in top-down or bottom-up approaches.13 Another 
way to categorise these approaches as strategies can be provided by the 
owners of the problem, the internal actors, or by external actors who in-
tervene. In this view, the top-down approach is often supported or con-
ducted by external actors. Typically, the lack of a proper understanding 
of the  situation forms a major problem for the intervening actor. Christia, 
for instance, describes in detail the continuously shifting ‘intergroup al-
liances in multiparty conflicts’ in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia. Kitzen 
refers to the same dynamic of local leaders in contemporary Afghan tribal 
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society.14 These shifting alliances eventually lead to interveners having 
supported their own foes, and both authors show that these ‘alliances’ 
are actually based on local leaders’ self-interest and opportunism. ‘Alli-
ance’-labels, therefore, might be hardly useful and probably irrelevant at 
the local level, and only make sense as part of an ‘externally imposed con-
struct’ – what sociologists and anthropologist term an etic framework.15 
This is the opposite of the bottom-up, local, perspective incorporating the 
view of the problem-owners – better known as ‘emic’ –, which greatly en-
hances understanding of the local situation.16 Moreover, such an approach 
also fosters collaboration with the local populace, and allows for identifi-
cation and achieving of locally attainable goals. However, this is not to say 
that a local perspective is the solution to all problems. Kilcullen explains 
the necessity to strike a balance between both an external and internal 
actor-driven approach: to avoid fetishising external, technocratic, top-
down, white-guy-with-clipboard knowledge. At the same time, it also tries 
to avoid the magical thinking associated with treating local  people as the 
fount of all knowledge and insight. If locals could  understand and agree 
on the problem, let alone fix it, there’d be no need for outside  intervention. 
If outsiders understood and could fix the problem, their  interventions 
wouldn’t be failing so often. Both outsiders and locals need to come 
 together, in defined spheres of expertise and in a defined process, to jointly 
design approaches to the problem.17
Thus, co-designing an acceptable solution from both internal and  external 
perspectives provides a solution for enhancing popular support and bol-
stering the position of a local government. This might have far reaching 
consequences as the local perspective of success, which can only be under-
stood in emic terms, should inform an external actor’s political choices and 
strategy.18 Bar-Yam supports this as he underlines the necessity of involving 
people within any complex civilisation-system and stresses the relevance of 
analysing the complexity and scale of necessary behaviour to counter in-
ternal and external challenges.19 In line with the importance of humans in 
conflict and the primacy of behaviour, both local and political notions of 
success should not only be defined as measurable, realistic and attainable 
objectives, but should take account of localised human behaviour.
Competitive control
Building an influencing framework also requires exploring the utility of 
the theory of competitive control in the conduct of modern war. Kilcullen 
has based his theory on the work of, among others, Fall, who, debating the 
 Vietnam War, explained that ‘any sound revolutionary warfare operator … 
most of the time used small-war tactics – not to destroy …, of which they 
were thoroughly incapable, but to establish a competitive system of control 
over the population’.20 In this regard, the ‘military aspect’ is only the sup-
porting effort, while the political, administrative and ideological aspects are 
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the primary efforts ‘to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system’. 
Kilcullen has expanded upon this view of competitive control:
In irregular conflicts …, the local armed actor that a given popula-
tion perceives as best able to establish a predictable, consistent, and 
wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate 
that population and its residential areas. Simply put, the idea is that 
populations respond to a predictable, ordered, normative system that 
tells them exactly what they need to do, and not do, in order to be safe.21
This theory, however, can be challenged. Most fundamentally, it is criticised 
for assuming that, in order to compete for control, actors have to ‘establish’ 
a normative system. We start from this position and note that rather than 
creating a new normative system, there is already ‘some set of [local] activi-
ties’ in place, which forms the actual object of competition.22 Thus, there is 
no requirement to establish a new system. Actors might instead aim to alter 
the existing local normative system to their advantage.
The key mechanism underlying the concept of competitive control is the 
prevalence of predictability and consistency over the content of a rule-set 
for enforcing the normative system.23 Kilcullen explains that consistently 
enforcing the publicly known rule-set leads to a perception of safety and 
‘allows a normative system to function’. The distance between the prefer-
ences of the actors and the policies enacted – and not the ideological position 
itself – is the issue at stake.24 While rebels have a vested interest in aspiring 
for their ideal doctrine, they will, if necessary, adopt a pragmatic approach 
and enact policies closer to civilian preferences to enlarge popular support, 
making ideological distance a tool to influence a population. The premise 
here is that it is not merely the ‘doctrinal’ position or distance that matters; 
it is the enactment of its divergence from the popular median that is most 
relevant. Yet again, it is tangible behaviour that matters most.
When we seek to study the way behaviour can be influenced as part of the 
conduct of war, it is also important to stress that ‘control’ should not be mis-
taken with ‘imposing order through unquestioned dominance’. Instead it boils 
down to ‘achieving collaboration towards a set of share objectives’.25 Whereas 
non-state opponents might adopt an approach of establishing control through 
coercion, Western-type state actors typically favour more persuasive actions 
such as provision of essential services and effective legislation.26 In both cases, 
however, control can be understood as the ability to influence the behaviour 
of the relevant population(s). This offers a first point for expanding this theory 
as today’s complicated conflicts are typified by the involvement of a myriad of 
actors, both state and non-state. The question, therefore, is whom exactly to 
control in order to obtain success in modern warfare.
The primary actors in any conflict ecosystem are the forces of the gov-
erning authorities and the challengers who are vying for power, but also 
the population. Traditionally, the struggle for control is conceptualised as 
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a contest between the former two over the population. As such, this latter 
category is implicitly denied agency. This, however, is far off from reality 
as civilians themselves employ different ‘survival strategies’ such as flee-
ing, passivity, armed neutrality, supporting one actor, periodically switch-
ing sides or simultaneously supporting all sides in the contest for control.27 
Moreover, people also hold an interest in the level of control of their ‘rulers’, 
aspire for a degree of self-determination and self-rule and are, for instance, 
consciously interested in the ‘doctrine’ that governs daily life.28 The strug-
gle for control therefore is a highly dynamic three way affair that also in-
volves the relevant population. These actors, their interrelationship and the 
context are visualised in Figure 5.1. The ‘control’-dot indicates the level of 
control per objective an actor aims to achieve. Indeed, all three actors are to 
some extent capable of influencing the level of control. Considering the pop-
ulation as passive bystanders, therefore, will lead to a flawed understanding. 
A binary interpretation of the competition for control, thus, ignores the in-
tricacies of the social system as a whole.
It should be noted that the three primary actors in our model each are 
far from homogeneous. Authorities typically consist of governments and 
 supporting intervening states, populations often reflect the fragmented char-
acter of a conflict society and often more than one rebel group is competing for 
influence. Another, related, feature of the contemporary security environment 
Figure 5.1 Actor/Control Model
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is that conflicts are rarely isolated events. Instead, contextual factors such as 
foreign or transnational support frequently form the background of the dy-
namical contest for control. This is further complicated by the support which 
comes from different foreign actors and agencies, each of whom may have 
competing objectives.29 Thus, the modern conflict ecosystem reflects a mosaic 
of different actors that interact with each other and with external influences. 
This indicates there is no ‘one level of control’: the extent of control an ac-
tor exerts might differ per objective the actor aims to achieve. A government 
might be able to influence people to register as voters, but may be completely 
unable to persuade them to provide intelligence on insurgent activities. There-
fore, it is necessary to distinguish between different objectives and required 
level of control, and determine appropriate influence strategies. Without play-
ing down the complexity of modern conflicts, the proposed three-actor model 
offers a first step for understanding this highly dynamic competition as it can 
be applied per objective, with the ‘control’-dot (Figure 5.1) visualising the cur-
rent and desired situation. Our model offers a first indication of which actor(s) 
should be influenced in order to obtain the sought-after effect.
How to put this into action? First it is important to discuss the question 
of how exactly influencing works. Human decision making is considered to 
be ‘rational’, that is, based on a cost-benefit calculus.30 Behavioural studies, 
like Kahneman, remind us that decisions and choices are affected by differ-
ent factors and limitations such as time and a sense of crisis.31 These factors 
affect one’s ability to formulate and execute logical strategies as well as the 
understanding of actions and the consequent counterreactions of others.32 
When applied to modern warfare this may lead to diverging conclusions: 
either to a simplification bias, with actors expecting logically derived results 
of another actor’s cost-benefit calculus or to the conviction that targeting 
behaviour is too difficult and will lead to unpredictable effects.33 Further-
more, there is also the question whether or not all actors in a system are in-
fluenceable. Deterrence theory, for instance, considers influencing terrorists 
troublesome.34 While, indeed, some actors might be so (un)supportive of a 
doctrine that they will probably not alter their behaviour, the vast majority 
of people are influenceable (see Figure 5.2). There might be a percentage of 
‘irreconcilables’, whose convictions are unalterable and whose behaviour 
cannot be influenced. These extremes, however, are rare, and even die-hard 
true believing terrorists are often influenceable.35
Figure 5.2 Ability to Influence Actors36
Control from the ground up 9
An individual’s behaviour is difficult to predict. As a social species, hu-
mans in a group are targetable and amendable for change. Defining and 
distinguishing groups is often oversimplified and as such either irrelevant 
or incorrect. Complexity theory offers help for overcoming this problem 
and advances the understanding of relevant groups.37 When a subgroup of a 
 complex system has coordinated behaviour, or simply put, when  ‘members’ 
of a single defined group within the system act in a similar vein when 
 confronted with the same specific impulses, the group has been defined 
 correctly. A well-defined group, therefore, is better understandable and 
 influenceable than an individual.38
It is important to keep the context in mind and analyse a group on the right 
level. A lack of nuance in dichotomising groups typically leads to incorrect 
conclusions about peoples’ behaviour. The specific facts on the ground in-
fluence the behaviour of the population. For instance, even under the rigid 
self-proclaimed Islamic State-regime, there were enormous differences in 
behaviour and survival strategies between fighting age males who recently 
lost their wives and family and married fighting age males who believed in 
their ability to keep their relatives safe. This shows the relevance of prop-
erly vetting groups and their specifics.39 It also demonstrates that the social 
spectrum as a whole should be understood in a nuanced and deliberate way. 
Identifying and segmenting relevant groups, therefore, is a highly difficult 
process which needs to be done to correctly identify attainable  behavioural 
aims.
To summarise, it is important to note that we have identified three alter-
ations to the theory of competitive control. First, instead of establishing a 
new normative system of governance, altering the existing system is a more 
likely approach. Second, we highlight a three-actor model. This means that 
authorities should include both challenger(s) and population when impos-
ing a normative system, while also considering their own role and (biased) 
 understanding. Third, we found that an actionable approach should focus 
on changing the visible and tangible behaviour of actors by influencing 
 relevant groups that need to be purposely identified. This of course requires 
a thorough understanding of local dynamics, which is intimately related to 
the aforementioned premise of co-design. Let us now discuss a framework 
for embedding this in the conduct of war.
A framework for embedding influence activities in the 
conduct of war
Influencing encompasses employing activities that are part of a spectrum 
varying from persuasion to annihilation for either directly or indirectly 
addressing relevant actors. In case of a competition for control, contesters 
apply ‘a range of capabilities across a spectrum from persuasion through 
administration to coercion, and they are designed by armed actors –  owners 
or proponents of the system – as a mean to corral, control, manipulate, 
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and mobilize a population’.40 However, as mentioned, this first requires ac-
tors to understand the problem and those involved and formulate realistic 
 objectives. While a framework is helpful for operationalising this approach, 
it should be emphasised that any concept is a guide. Yet, this provides utility 
for realising the desired level of control. In its simplest form our proposed 
framework encompasses three interrelated stages comprising understand, 
influence and effect (Figure 5.3).41 This represents a conceptual approach 
of an actor’s process of influencing the actual outcome of a situation (which 
can be visualised by repositioning the ‘control-dot’ in Figure 5.1). While 
these three stages might appear blatantly obvious, influence activities often 
take place without properly defining the (non-)desired and attainable effects 
or without an appropriate understanding of the situation.
The process itself is, of course, debatable and apparent critique on the lin-
ear projection of these steps need to be addressed directly, because it depicts 
a highly simplified concept of reality. The perpetual changing actors, their 
interests, circumstances, continuous learning, actions and counterreactions 
will never be reflected by such a simplified process. However, this model 
provides a clear analytical framework to start with. Let us now first turn to 
its different stages.
To understand violent conflicts and to help realise solutions etic and 
 top-down perspectives remain relevant. This may include open source anal-
ysis and other research conducted by for instance intelligence services and 
think-tanks. Such research should focus on attainable behavioural change 
of the population and challengers to achieve the desired solutions. Emic 
and local-level understanding of the situation are, however, essential to 
achieve lasting solutions. Micro-level analysis according to  anthropological 
and sociological research protocols helps to understand the emic perspec-
tive.42 The outcomes should be broadened by incorporating the insights 
of local residents, who bring a micro-level understanding of their own 
 environment. This ground truth understanding can be achieved through for 
instance  community policing or deploying special operations forces, who 
traditionally focus on  intelligence-collection and forging local partnerships. 
Consequently, local and bottom-up perspectives should be coupled – or 
co-designed – with etic and top-down perspectives which will aid in formu-
lating broader spectrum solutions and will also place these solutions within 
a wider context.
Figure 5.3 Proposed Understand, Influence and Effect Framework
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While not aiming to describe all possibilities for influencing an actor, 
it should be noted that the suggested approach is most inclusive.43 On the 
one end of the influence-spectrum (Figure 5.4) one will find consensual 
strategies such as persuasion, co-optation and cooperation. In the middle, 
one will find administrative strategies such as legislation, service provision 
and judicial or legal procedures. On the other end of the spectrum, one 
will find the threat or use of force, including targeting and decapitation 
strategies.
There is significant overlap, interrelationship and reciprocity between 
all these concepts. Furthermore, the activities can be further subdivided 
as persuasion, for instance, might involve incentives, inducements, reas-
surances or other positive reinforcement measures. The framework thus 
incorporates all available influence options and aims to broaden the spec-
trum of target groups to include segments of the authorities, the challeng-
ers and the population. This also opens the way for practices traditionally 
 associated with interstate conflicts to be applied more widely; the broadest 
possible spectrum of activities should be contemplated to achieve the de-
sired  effects. For instance, although coercive diplomacy is developed for 
state  interaction, it should not be dismissed as a feasible strategy against 
non-state actors.44 Last, all activities should be aimed at influencing the lo-
cal level, while also incorporated in the political-level strategy. This is dis-
tinct from current practice, in which political interests exclusively dictate 
activities on the ground and sometimes even hamper successful conduct of 
activities.45
To make the theoretical persuasion-coercion spectrum practically  applicable 
it is relevant to define what the objectives are and how these can be achieved. 
Conceptions of desired effects matter and too simplistic and externally com-
posed notions such as ‘a safe and secure environment’ or ‘stability’ are prob-
lematic in the practical reality on the ground. Kilcullen emphasises an emic 
perspective, and underlines the necessity of ‘a constant realization that outsid-
ers don’t understand how things work, and therefore need to experiment, test 
hypotheses, start off small, and seek local  context’. Furthermore, when aiming 
Figure 5.4 Influence Spectrum
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to influence particular actors to achieve desired effects, then there should be 
methods to understand the efficacy of influencing. Measuring desired and 
non-desired effects, therefore, should be based on (quantifiable) behavioural 
outcomes and focus should be less on the  current practice of measurement of 
performance such as measuring how many operations have been conducted or 
measuring how many insurgents have been killed or detained.
Putting this framework to practice requires integration from the onset 
of a mission. Hence co-designing is not only instrumental in establishing a 
profound understanding and identifying the right effects as well as methods 
for measuring them, it is also highly important for the sake of embedding 
influence activities in the conduct of war. But how to make sense of such a 
complicated task and start co-designing?
Understanding the level of control is a first step which can be specified 
by defining the different ‘avenues’ or ‘lines’ of conflict. Fisher and Mer-
cado propose the use of the United Nations Development Programme’s 16 
areas of governance as a starting point for defining the ‘lines of conflict’ 
and ‘lines of control’, possibly in conjunction with the ‘lines of effort’ as 
detailed in Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency.46 RAND, in its seminal 
work Paths to Victory, has conducted a review of nearly 300 factors of influ-
ence on 70 counterinsurgency case-studies and, using both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis, identified the 26 most relevant effects to achieve or 
avoid for success in counterinsurgency. Using these factors could provide 
a useful guideline for influence activities designed to fit the local context.47 
RAND’s factors are quantifiable, measurable and include various actors in 
the conflict ecosystem. Refining these factors into desired and non-desired 
behavioural outcomes can provide a solid starting point for a ‘government’ 
as this actor’s input for the co-design phase, leading to specific and locally 
attainable desired outcomes based on actual behaviour.
Dissecting the desired end state into specific and measurable factors will 
allow for a more nuanced and precise view, and will probably contribute 
to addressing the problem effectively. This will also improve identification 
and classification of the extent to which actors have influence over a spe-
cific ‘line’ or ‘path’. Key, however, is that this framework merely provides 
a  starting point and that the actual strategy for influencing the behaviour 
of relevant segments of a society should be devised using a local, context- 
specific and emic perspective.
Further it is essential to grasp that there is a degree of control, which 
might differ per specific factor. While binary juxtaposition aids quanti-
tative analysis and simplifies reporting, only qualitative nuance will lead 
to relevant, measurable and attainable objectives. Formulating these ob-
jectives in behavioural terms, such as ‘the local population provides ac-
tionable  intelligence on rebel activities’, helps quantifying them and doing 
so will help minimise the risk of mistaking measures of performance 
with  measures of effectiveness. A more encompassing and elaborated 
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framework, as  presented in Figure 5.5, takes the abovementioned aspects 
into account.
Conclusion
Humans are central to conflict and as such influencing the behaviour of 
 relevant actors is essential. The theory of competitive control has provided 
us with a starting ground for embedding influence activities in the conduct of 
war. In our view, however, three alterations are necessary. First, there is no 
need to establish a new normative governance system, since there is already 
a normative system in place which can be altered for establishing control. 
Second, the scope of targeted actors should be broadened to  include author-
ities, challengers and the population. Third, focus should be on changing 
actual human behaviour. This can be attained by targeting groups instead 
of individuals. Relevant groups should be properly defined and understood 
in the context of the overall conflict ecosystem.
For this approach to succeed it should be tailored to the specific lo-
cal  situation. Co-designing solutions and approaches, incorporating 
both an etic and emic perspective, combining top-down and bottom-up 
 approaches all function to achieve a shared understanding. This provides 
an  underpinning for defining and conducting influence activities as well as 
an understanding of how to interpret results and measure success. Such a 
localised approach also implies that local behavioural objectives, as formu-
lated in the co-design phase, should be incorporated in the political aims 
of host and intervening states, which requires flexibility in the (political) 
strategy. In current practice, however, political guidance is rarely adjusted 
to context-specific results and often dictates actual activities. Instead of 
Figure 5.5 Elaborated Understand, Influence and Effect Framework
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rigidly sticking to overarching concepts, including (a perception of) legit-
imacy, it is important to adapt these concepts in such a way that they are 
relevant on the local level.
This chapter has presented a framework for embedding influence activ-
ities in the conduct of war. The phases understand, influence, and effect 
offer a clear path for deploying a full spectrum of influence activities on the 
basis of an appropriate understanding of the conflict ecosystem, its dynam-
ics and the way to influence relevant groups. This, however, should always 
be  tailored to the specific circumstances. Doing so gives the much-needed 
guidance for obtaining the desired effect(s). The suggested framework, 
therefore, should be considered a first step for enhancing existing influence 
activities in the conduct of war. As human behaviour will remain domi-
nant in future conflicts population-centric concepts should be anchored and 
serve to sharpen thinking on war and peacemaking.
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